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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ACCULOG, INC., a State of 
Colorado corporation, 
ROBERT PFISTER and KENTON 
SHAW, co-partners doing 
business under the firm 
name and style of ACCULOG 
FIELD SERVICES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KEITH PETERSON, dba, 
PETERSON FORD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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Case No. 18133 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REMANDING THE CASE 
FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY BECAUSE 
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY WAS PREVIOUSLY 
DETERMINED, NOT APPEALED, AND IS NOT SO 
INTERMINGLED WITH ISSUES REMAINING TO BE 
DETERMINED THAT FAIRNESS TO BOTH PARTIES REQUIRES 
A RETRIAL OF ALL ISSUES. 
<:; 
The jury in this matter heard the evidence of liability 
and causation including the testimonies of each side's expert 
witnesses. The jury expressly found that the Defendant 
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negligently serviced the Plaintiffs's van 
negligence was a proximate cause of the fire. 
Interrogatories Nos. 1. and 2.) The Defendant 
and that such 
(Special verdict 
did not appeal 
this findin9 and therefore the same is res judicata and should be 
considered established at the next trial. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 
Utah, 667 P.2d 598 (1983). Even had the issue been appealed, 
the record shows that there was substantial evidence to support 
the finding and that it therefore should not be disturbed by the 
court. Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., Utah, 666 P.2d 876 
(1983). This Court in its opinion ruled that the Defendant 
failed to prove any contributary causation on the part of the 
Plaintiffs. Because there is no question remaining regarding 
causation of the fire it is illogical, burdensome and ·Unfair to 
put the Plaintiffs to the burden of again proving the Defendant's 
negligence. 
Whether a finding should be reopened in connection with a 
new trial on the issue of liability depends on whether the issue 
of liability and the remaining issues are so intermingled that 
fairness to both parties requires retrial of all issues. Groen, 
supra. at page 607, Footnote 11; Nelson v. Trujillo, Utah, 657 
P.2d 730 (1982); Printe?d Terry Finishi!'g Co. v. Lebanon, 274 Pa. 
Super 277, 372 A.2d 460. There is no intermingling of issues in 
this matter. The only issues that truly remain to be considered 
are 1) whether the Plaintiff's are entitled to recover lost 
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profits and, if so, how much, and 2) the value of the van. The 
value of the equipment destroyed was stipulated to at trial 
" because the equipment was new and newly purchased at the time it 
was destroyed. These issues are clearly separate from the issue 
of liability. The issue of failure to mitigate damages should 
not be before the Court for the reasons set forth in Points II 
and III. However, even if mitigation of damages is in issue at 
the subsequent trial, the issue of mitigation is clearly separate 
from and not so intermingled with the issue of liability that the 
parties should be required to relitigate the issue of causation. 
This Court in its opinion herein has stated that there is a 
"material distinction" between 11 injury" and "damages". Because 
the evidence related to causation of the fire herein is wholly 
unrelated to issues of amount of damages and mitigation of 
damages, the Plaintiffs should not be required to reproduce three 
out-of-state witnesses as well as an out-of-state expert witness 
to reprove causation five years after their injury. This case 
should be remanded to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs on the 
issue of liability and for a new trial regarding issues related 
to unstipulated damages as was done in Henderson v. Meyer, Utah 
533 P.2d 290 (1975). 
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POINT II 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN CONSIDERING THE 
ISSUE OF MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AND IN APPARENTLY 
RULING THAT THE SAME MAY BE CONSIDERED AT THE 
NEXT TRIAL BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS NEVER PLEAD OR 
OTHERWISE ASSERTED AT THE PREVIOUS TRIAL OR 
OTHERWISE PRESERVED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THIS 
APPEAL. 
The Defendant never pleaded as an affirmative defense 
that the Plaintiffs had failed to mitigate damages. Likewise the 
defense of mitigation of damages was never asserted in the prior 
trial and was not raised on appeal by the Defendant. It is true 
that after the Plaintiff objected to the admission of evidence 
regarding the fire extinguisher the tria~ court compared the 
causation problem with a mitigation problem but the Defendant 
never attempted to raise a mitigation defensP. Had he so done, 
the Plaintiffs would have objected. 
Since mitigation of damages was never plecid nor raised at 
the trial the issue was permanently waived and court has no 
jurisdiction to consider the issue or to allow the issue to be 
considered at a retrial. Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Pratt v. Board of Education of the Uintah County 
School District, Utah, 564 P.2d 294 (1977); Phillips v. JCM 
Development Corp., Utah, 666 P.2d 876 (1983). The Defendants had 
their opportunity to properly plead and litigate the issue but 
having neglected to do so the issue in now barred by res 
judicata. Mendenhall v. Kingston, Utah, 610 P.2d 1287 (1980); 
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Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962). Groen v. 
Tri-O-Inc., supra. In justification of this rule it has been 
stated that a defendant should not be permitted to split his 
defenses and present them piecemeal in successive actions out of 
the same transaction, that there must be an end to litigation, 
and that where a party has an opportunity to present a defense 
and neglects to do so, the demands of the law require that he 
take the consequences. 46 Am Jur 2d, 'Judgments, §§431, 453. 
Consistent with the relief requested in Point I, retrial should 
therefore be limited to the issues of loss of profits and the 
value of the van. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN APPARENTLY RULING 
THAT FAILURE TO HAVE A FIRE EXTINGUISHER MAY BE 
CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF FAILURE TO MITIGATE 
DAMAGES. 
Even if the issue of mitigation of damages is to be 
allowed to be raised for the first time at the new .trial, the 
issue should be raised only within the realm of rational 
precedent'and logic. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Oaks 
appears to invite the trial court to rule that a failure to have 
a fire extinguisher may constitute a failure to mitigate damages 
even when it requires a plaintiff to anticipate, without having 
any prior warning that he or his property is in actual jeopardy, 
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that someone may cause him harm. Plaintiffs have yet to see any 
one produce a case requiring an unsuspecting party to possess a 
fire extinguisher. Kelly v. Capital Motors, s.c., 28 S.E.2d 836 
(1944), cited in the main opinion is directly to the contrary as 
it should be. The concurring opinion appears to set this court 
off- on a new path hitherto untrodden upon by the courts of this 
country. If victims must carry fire extinguishers they must also 
carry insurance and therefore, the collateral source rule must 
fall and this court's decision in DuBois v. Nye, Utah, 584 P.2d 
823 (1978) must be set aside since any prudent person with a 
sizeable investment should have insurance to protect it as well 
as a fire extinguisher. 
The motorcycle 
carefully considered. 
helmet case cited by Justice Oaks must be 
(Halvorson v. Voeller, N.D., 336 N.W.2d 
118 (1983).) First, the issue is a new one and there is a split 
of authority as to whether failure to wear a motorcycle helmet 
may consititue a failure to mitigate damages. See Rogers v. 
Frush, 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549, 40 ALR 3rd 847 and other cases 
cited in 40 ALR 3rd 856, Annotation Failure of Motorcyplist to 
Wear Protective Helmet or Other Safety Equipment as Contributory 
Negligence, Assumption of Risk, or Failure to Avoid Consequences 
of Accident. Second, courts have been unwilling to allow the 
failure to wear a helmet to be used as any kind of defense absent 
a legislatively imposed duty to wear a helmet for purposes of 
8 0 
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personal safety. (See prior cited authorities) Only after the 
legislature has imposed a duty to wear a helmet or a seatbelt for 
purposes of personal safety have courts been willing to impose a 
duty upon a victim to anticipate that another person would 
wrongfully harm him. The majority rule remains that failure to 
wear a seatbelt may not be considered as evidence of failure to 
mitigate damages. See Annotation Mitigation of Damages - Use of 
Seatbelt, 80 ALR 3rd 1033, 
cited. 
and other authorities previously 
Again the issue is a tricky one and this court should not 
even seek easy answers in litmus paper tests such as "has the 
legislature or some other lawmaking body required by law that 
this victim have done thus-and-such? 11 • The reason for this may 
be quickly grasped by looking at the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act 
§31-41-1 et~ seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The 
legislature has clearly imposed a duty upon all automobile owners 
to have insurance. Since this duty has been imposed, will this 
court eliminate the collateral source rule and allow insurance 
benefits received to be considered as mitigated damages and will 
this court rule that an uninsured motorist who is injured by a 
negligent defendant is without recourse because 'he failed to 
anticipate the accident by having insurance? Such a ruling would 
not be consistent with the motive of the the legislature in 
passing the law since the stated purpose was to stabilize 
9 
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insurance rates and to effectuate the disposition'of small 
personal injury claims: not to grant defendants a mitigation of 
damages defense. (See §31-41-2. "Purpose of Act"J 
Absent a law requiring that all persons must carry fire 
extinguishers with them at all times, the failure to have a fire 
extinguisher must not be allowed as ~vidence of failure to 
mitigate damages. Likewise even if a law were to exist requiring 
a person to hav~ a fire exinguisher pre~ent to protect person or 
property, without clear proof that the legislature intended that 
a victim should not be compensated for his injuries in the event 
of failure to comply with the law, a court has no business making 
law to that effect. 
Among other reasons for not permitting a fire 
extinguisher defense are that the defense would improperly 
require juries to speculate as to what would have happened had a 
fire extinguisher been present and used (Fischer v. Moore, 183 
Colo 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973)) and that it would set up a 
standard of care which no one has proven that most people have 
adopted (Mccord v. Green, Dist. Col. App., 362 A.2d 720 (1976)). 
Also, the concurring opinion is contrary to this court's 
statement that a Plaintiff has no obligation to mitigate damages 
by taking action which a defendant having primary duty of 
performance has failed to take. Alexander v. Brown, Utah, 646 
P.2d 692 (1982). The Defendant had the prima~y duty to prevent a 
10 C'' 
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fire to the van and its contents and, therefore, he cannot 
complain about the failure of the Plaintiff to perform this duty 
for him. Alexander, supra. at page 695. 
Therefore, this court should, in harmony with established 
law, refuse to send this case back for any hearing on the issue 
of mitigation of damages, and should particularly refuse to 
resubmit thE~ issue of failure to have a fire extinguisher. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the issues remaining to 'be determined are 
unrelated to liability, the Plaintiff should not"be required to 
relitigate the Defendant's negligence and causation of the fire. 
Also, since the issue of mitigation of damages has never been 
properly raised it should not be considered at the new trial and, 
even if failure to mitigate may now be pleaded by the Defendant, 
no evidence regarding failure to have a fire extinguisher should 
be admissable. 
Respectfully submitted •.••....••..•...............•.... 
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•••••••••••• this It day of May, 1984. 
PAUL w. MORTENSEN I 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
c--· 
rthnF c:~h:zS7e d j 
ARRY E. SNOW 
Attorney for Plaintiffs~ 
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h•ereby certify that I mailed two ( 2) true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to Nelson L. 
Hayes, counsel for the Defendant-Respondant, RICHARDS, BRANDT, 
MILLER & NELSON, P. Q. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, 
dated this //;,J't!-aay of May, 1984. 
SECRETARY 
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